Abstract-Weak probabilistic noninterference is a security property for enforcing confidentiality in multi-threaded programs. It aims to guarantee secure flow of information in the program and ensure that sensitive information does not leak to attackers. In this paper, the problem of verifying weak probabilistic noninterference by leveraging formal methods, in particular algorithmic verification, is discussed. Behavior of multi-threaded programs is modeled using probabilistic Kripke structures and formalize weak probabilistic noninterference in terms of these structures. Then, a verification algorithm is proposed to check weak probabilistic noninterference. The algorithm uses an abstraction technique to compute quotient space of the program with respect to an equivalence relation called weak probabilistic bisimulation and does a simple check to decide whether the security property is satisfied or not. The progress made is demonstrated by a real-world case study. It is expected that the proposed approach constitutes a significant step towards more widely applicable secure information flow analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Motivation
In information security, a confidentiality policy prevents the unauthorized disclosure of information. Confidentiality policies are defined in terms of confidentiality mechanisms, which are approaches to enforce the policies [1] . Cryptography and access control are examples of confidentiality mechanisms. But they do not restrict the flow of information inside a program. For example, when an android application grants permission to access contacts, there is no cryptography or access control mechanism to verify legal use of the contacts by the application. This is where secure information flow comes to the rescue.
Secure information flow controls the way information flows throughout a program. Information flow properties are designed to prevent the information from flowing to an unauthorized user, i.e., attacker or low-observer [2] . Typically, it is supposed that there are two security levels, high (H) and low (L), corresponding to higher and lower confidentiality for program variables respectively. An information flow property is defined in such a way that it prevents data in H from flowing to L. More complex hierarchies of security levels can be defined via a security structure [3] . Information flow properties are of paramount significance for guaranteeing confidentiality of data. Because of this, it is desirable to establish an automatic and efficient verification approach for secure information flow.
B. Background
In most of researches done on secure information flow, a security property specifying the confidentiality policy is formally defined and then a verification method is proposed to check the property. Noninterference [4] is a long-established information flow property, stipulating that high data may not interfere with low data. The absence of interference requires indistinguishability of program behavior, as secret inputs are varied.
Probabilistic noninterference is a widely-used security property for multi-threaded programs, proposed by Volpano and Smith [5] , and extended by Sabelfeld and Sands [6] . It is a timing-and probabilistic-sensitive property, defined over a simple imperative language with dynamic thread creation. Sabelfeld and Sands define a timing-sensitive partial probabilistic bisimulation to characterize indistinguishability of the executions of the program. The intuition is that lowequivalent states must produce executions that run in lock-step, affect the shared memory in the same way, and the probability of stepping to the states from the same equivalence class be the same [6] .
Smith [7] shows that probabilistic bisimulation is too strict regarding time. To address this problem, Smith defines probabilistic noninterference in terms of weak probabilistic bisimulation, allowing probabilistic systems to be regarded as equivalent when they do not run at the same time. The resultant property is called weak probabilistic noninterference, which requires low-equivalent states to produce executions that visit the same sequence of equivalence classes, but some executions may remain in a class longer that the other executions.
Verifying secure information flow is mostly done via information flow type systems. A type system is a formal system of type inference rules for reasoning about properties of programming languages [8] . In information flow type systems, Type systems are automated and compositional, but they are not extensible, as each new feature added to the programming language, or variation of the information flow property requires a redefinition of the type system and its soundness proof [10] . Consequently, algorithmic verification has been favored recently, which is the application of rigorous, mathematically sound, and fully automatic techniques to the analysis of systems. These techniques are more flexible than type systems, and give a precise and efficient mechanism to verify a variety of security properties, without the need to prove soundness repeatedly [11] .
Algorithmic verification techniques have been mostly developed for trace properties, which describe single executions of programs. But, most security properties, including weak probabilistic noninterference, are 2-safety properties. 2-safety properties predicate over two executions of a program and consequently, verification requires establishing relationships between two different executions [12] . For example, weak probabilistic noninterference is not a property of individual executions and hence not a trace property, because whether an execution is allowed by the property depends on whether another execution is also allowed. 2-safety properties are an important subset of relational properties, which describe multiple executions of one or more programs [13] . As most classical verification techniques are not adequate to reason about relational properties, recently, many new techniques have been developed for secure information flow [12] , [14] - [19] , but none for weak probabilistic noninterference. 
C. Foreground
In this paper, an algorithm is developed to verify weak probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs running under an arbitrary scheduler. The program to be verified is modeled by a probabilistic state transition system, called probabilistic Kripke structure. Weak probabilistic noninterference is formally defined in terms of semantics of the probabilistic Kripke structure. In the proposed analysis, a program satisfies weak probabilistic noninterference, if and only if all executions with low-equivalent initial states visit the same sequence of equivalent classes with respect to weak probabilistic bisimulation. The verification algorithm computes the quotient space, i.e., the set of all equivalence classes of the probabilistic Kripke structure and does a simple check to decide the satisfaction of the security property. The quotient space is an abstraction of the concrete model of a program and allows obtaining enormous state-space reductions, possibly avoiding sate explosion problem. It is shown that the proposed verification algorithm runs in polynomial time. A case study is provided to show the feasibility of the verification algorithm. Fig. 1 gives a clear picture of the proposed approach.
D. Structure of the Paper
The paper starts by an informal overview of the approach in Section II. The program model assumed throughout the paper is presented in Section III. Weak probabilistic noninterference is defined in Section IV, using weak probabilistic bisimulation. The verification algorithm, time complexity, and application of the algorithm to a case study are addressed in Section V. Discussing related work and comparisons are done in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper and discusses some future work.
II. OVERVIEW OF APPROACH
In this section, a tour of the proposed work is given. To build intuition for the proposed approach, the key idea is illustrated using an example.
For clarity, some informal definitions are discussed. Suppose an attacker has full knowledge of source code of a multi-threaded program, can choose a scheduler for its execution, and observe the program behavior under the chosen scheduler. By observing behavior, we mean the attacker can see values of public variables during the program execution. For example, she can print public values. If the attacker can infer information about secret (high) values of the program by observing public (low) values, the program is said to have a leak (or channel). Depending on the ability of the attacker, programs may have different leaks; e.g., explicit, implicit, or probabilistic leaks. Explicit leaks occur when a high value is assigned to a low variable; e.g., l:=h, assuming l is a low variable and h is a high variable. Implicit flows happen because of the control structure of a program; e.g., if h=1 then l:=1 else l:=0. Probabilistic leaks occur as a result of probabilistic behavior of the program. An example of this leak will be given in the following.
Secure information flow to the rescue. Secure information flow analysis aims to detect and consequently avoid information leaks in a program. Usually, it involves three main steps: 1) The program behavior is defined using a www.ijacsa.thesai.org program model; 2) The absence of leaks is defined using a security property; 3) A verification technique is developed to check the satisfaction ability of the property in the given program. In this paper, probabilistic Kripke structure (definition 1) is used to model the program behavior. Weak probabilistic noninterference (definition 8) of Smith [7] Smith [7] states that if a secure program is run starting from two low-equivalent states, then two executions must pass through the same sequence of equivalence classes. This is captured formally by the definition of weak probabilistic noninterference.
Definition 8 (Weak probabilistic noninterference):
Given a finite-memory scheduler S , a multi-threaded program MT satisfies weak probabilistic noninterference, iff The main steps of the verification algorithm are sketched in Algorithm 1. The algorithm takes a finite FPKS as input and returns secure if the FPKS satisfies weak probabilistic noninterference, and insecure if it does not. In the sequel, some steps of the algorithm are explained in more detail.
Taking a witness execution:
As pointed out earlier, all executions of the input FPKS are infinite and hence form a cycle. To take a witness execution, a cycle detection algorithm based on depth-first search, called colored DFS, is used. The algorithm initially marks all states white. It then proceeds by moving to successor states and coloring them, and terminates when a colored state (i.e. a state that was encountered before) is visited. The sequence of states remains in the stack of the depth-first search form the witness execution. 
B. Correctness of the Algorithm
Before diving into proving correctness of the proposed algorithm, a lemma is presented, which will be used in the correctness proof. This lemma asserts that p  can be lifted from states to executions and vice versa. 2  with the execution fragment 2   yields an execution fragment that fulfills the desired conditions. 
yields an execution that fulfills the desired conditions. Consequently, the resulting execution 2  is weak probabilistic bisimilar to 1  .
The following theorem proves correctness of the Algorithm 1. 
D. Case Study
The algorithm proposed in this paper has been implemented as part of SCT (Security Certifying Tool), which has been developed in JAVA to verify secure information flow for multi-threaded programs. SCT gets a probabilistic Kripke structure as model of the program and checks whether the program satisfies weak probabilistic noninterference. To our knowledge, no other algorithmic verification technique for weak probabilistic noninterference has been published, so it is not possible to compare the implementation to other algorithms.
As a case study, consider the problem of dining cryptographers. The problem is borrowed from [11] to show how an attacker can deduce secret information through probabilistic leaks. David Chaum first proposed this problem in 1988 as an example of anonymity and identity hiding [23] . In this problem, three cryptographers are sitting at a round table to have dinner at their favorite restaurant. The waiter informs them that the meal has been arranged to be paid by one of the cryptographers or their master. The cryptographers respect each other"s right to stay anonymous, but would like to know whether the master is paying or not. So, they decide to take part in the following two-stage protocol:
 Stage 1: Each cryptographer tosses an unbiased coin and only informs the cryptographer on the right of the outcome. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 8 . In this figure, c1, c2, and c3 are identities of cryptographer 1, cryptographer 2, and cryptographer 3 respectively.  Stage 2: Each cryptographer publicly announces whether the two coins that she can see are the same ("agree") or different ("disagree"). However, if she actually paid for the dinner, then she lies, i.e., she announces "disagree" when the coins are the same, and "agree" when they are different. An even number of "agree"s implies that none of the cryptographers paid (the master paid), while an odd number implies that one of the cryptographers paid. David Chaum names this protocol as Dining Cryptographers network or DCnet. DC-net is secure, since it does not leak the identity of the paying cryptographer (in case one of the cryptographers made arrangement to pay for the meal). Following Ngo [11] , to make this protocol leak information, a slight change is done: coins are biased, i.e., with probability 0.6 it comes up heads, and with probability 0.4 it comes up tails. www.ijacsa.thesai.org
To model the case study, PRISM has been used. PRISM is a tool for formal modeling and analysis of probabilistic systems [24] . PRISM describes models using the PRISM language, a simple, state-based language with a guarded command notation. The program is implemented in PRISM and its model is built. Then, export the explicit-state model, containing the set of reachable states and their labels, along with the transition matrix. Then, the model is given to SCT to compute the quotient space and check the security property. SCT was run on a PC with a Core i3 2.53 GHz CPU and 6 GB RAM.
Without lack of generality, suppose one of the cryptographers has made arrangement for the meal, and the other one is the attacker, i.e., the one who tries to find out the payer"s identity. To see how an attacker can infer the identity of the payer, consider an example scenario where cryptographer 2 is the attacker and aims to find out which one of the cryptographers 1 or 3 is the payer. Suppose cryptographer 2 and cryptographer 3 both toss tail. Cryptographer 2 can observe the coin of cryptographer 3, and thus announces "agree". Assume cryptographer 2 observes that cryptographer 1 announces "agree" and cryptographer 3 announces "disagree" for the values of the coins. Two situations corresponding to this case are shown in Fig. 9 and executions of these situations are outlined in Fig. 10 . In Fig. 10 , each state is represented as 10-tuples listing the current values of the variables (pay, agree1, agree2, agree3, coin1, s1, coin2, s2, coin3, s3) and labeled with the current value of parity: 0 for even number of "agree"s, and 1 for odd number of "agree"s. The variable pay contains the number of the cryptographer who is actually the payer. Variables agree1, agree2, and agree3 contain the announcements of cryptographer 1, 2, and 3, respectively: 0 for "disagree", and 1 for "agree". Variables coin1, coin2, and coin3 contain the coin values for cryptographer 1, 2, and 3, respectively: 1 for head, and 2 for tail. Finally, variables s1, s2, and s3 contain the status values for the three cryptographers: 0 for "not done", and 1 for "done". Execution 1  occurs when cryptographer 1 is the payer and tosses head. Therefore, cryptographer 1 announces "agree" and cryptographer 3 announces "disagree". Execution 2  occurs when cryptographer 3 is the payer and tosses tail. Thus, cryptographer 3 announces "disagree" and cryptographer 1 announces "agree". As seen in Fig. 10 , the probability of 1  (i.e. cryptographer 1 tossing head) is more than the probability of 2  (i.e. cryptographer 1 tossing tail) and hence the attacker can deduce that cryptographer 1 is more likely to be the payer. This is a probabilistic leak. www.ijacsa.thesai.org VI. RELATED WORK In the following, some related approaches from the literature are discussed and the proposed approach is compared with them.
Barthe et al. [10] propose the idea of self-composition for logical characterization of information flow properties. Selfcomposition reduces the problem of verifying information flow property for a program P to a safety property for a program derived from P, by composing P with a renaming of itself. Then, standard model checking and algorithmic verification techniques can be used to verify secure information flow. Terauchi and Aiken [14] introduce 2-safety properties, which can be refuted by observing two executions. They show that termination insensitive secure information flow problem is a 2-safety problem. They further generalize the idea of selfcomposition and show that it can be used to verify 2-safety properties. Huisman et al. [15] use the idea of self-composition to characterize secure information flow in CTL* and modal µ-calculus temporal logics. They specify secure information flow using observational determinism, an information flow property proposed by Zdancevic and Myers [25] for concurrent programs. Van der Meyden and Zhang [16] employ a selfcomposition-like method to reason about noninterference properties and develop algorithmic verification techniques for these properties. They characterize the computational complexity of the developed verification techniques and discuss some possible heuristics for optimizing the verification. Verification methods that use the idea of self-composition suffer from the state-space explosion problem, i.e., space needed to store the states and transitions of the program exceed the available memory. This occurs because in self-composition a program model is composed with a copy of itself. In the proposed algorithm, the program model is composed with only a small part of the model (witness execution). Furthermore, security analysis is done on the abstract model (quotient space), not on the concrete model. Ngo et al. [26] propose scheduler-specific probabilistic observational determinism as a property to specify secure information flow for probabilistic multi-threaded programs. They define the property based on two conditions. First condition requires that all traces of each public variable starting in the same initial state are stuttering equivalent. A trace of an execution is a mapping of states of the execution to the corresponding state labels. Two traces are stuttering equivalent if they become the same after removing repeating adjacent labels. Second s . Then, they transform the FPKSs to stuttering-free ones and check equivalence of the probabilistic languages arising from executions of the two FPKSs using an off-the-shelf algorithm.
The time complexity of the algorithm is   A trending field in security verification is proof-based verification, in which mathematical logic is used to describe the program, specify the property of interest, and prove satisfiability of the property. Hoare logic [27] is one of the most widely-used logics for proof-based verification of software. Variants of Hoare logic have been proposed for verifying relational, and in particular, k-safety properties [28] [29] [30] . An advantage of these techniques is that they avoid the state-space explosion problem, because they do not check the whole state space of the program. Consequently, they are suitable for verifying programs with huge, and even infinite, state space. A disadvantage with these techniques is that they are semi-automatic. Although many of the proof steps are done mechanically, some steps need expert user intervention. This contrasts with algorithmic verification, which is fully automatic.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, the problem of verifying weak probabilistic noninterference was discussed. Weak probabilistic noninterference is a notion of confidentiality for multi-threaded programs. The behavior of multi-threaded programs running under the control of a scheduler was modeled by probabilistic Kripke structures. Weak probabilistic noninterference was formalized in terms of executions of the probabilistic Kripke structure. Then, a verification algorithm was proposed to check the property.
As future work, we plan to use the proposed algorithm to verify other information flow properties. We believe the applicability of the algorithm can be extended and it can be used to verify many security properties, such as strong security [6] and probabilistic noninterference [6] . In an earlier paper [31] , we used a similar algorithm to verify observational determinism.
A disadvantage of the proposed verification algorithm is that it works on explicit model of the program, which may be too huge for real-world programs. This harms scalability of the approach. To solve this problem, one can change the algorithm in such a way that it works on abstract models of the program, such as binary decision diagrams.
We also aim to modify the algorithm to support compositional verification, thereby reducing conceptual complexity and making the analysis scale.
